We de ne the notions of reducibility and completeness in two party and multi-party private computations. Let g be an n-argument function. We s a y that a function f is reducible to a function g if n honest-but-curious players can compute the function f n -privately, given a black-box for g for which they secretly give inputs and get the result of operating g on these inputs. We s a y that g is complete for private computations if every function f is reducible to g.
Introduction
We consider two party and multi-party private computations. Quite informally, given an arbitrary nargument function f, a t -private protocol should allow n players, each possessing an individual secret input, to satisfy simultaneously the following two constraints: 1 Correctness: all players learn the value of f and 2 Privacy: no set of at most t faulty players learns more about the initial inputs of other players than is implicitly revealed by f's output. This problem, also known as secure c omputation, h a v e been examined in the literature with two substantially di erent t ypes of faulty players malicious i.e. Byzantine players and honest-but-curious players. Below w e discuss some known results with respect to each of these two t ypes of players.
Secure computation for malicious players. Malicious players may deviate from the prescribed protocol in an arbitrary manner, in order to violate the correctness and privacy constraints. The rst honest-but-curious players malicious players computational model Yao-82, GMW-87 assuming trapdoor permutations t n t n 2 exist private-channels model t n 2 t n 3
Figure 1: The number of faulty players, t, tolerable in each of the basic secure computation models with n players general protocols for secure computation were given in Yao-82, Y ao-86 for the two-party case, and by GMW-87 for the multi-party case. Other solutions were given in, e.g., GHY-87, GV-87, BGW-88, CCD-88, BB-89, RB-89, C K OR-97 based on various assumptions either intractability assumptions or physical assumptions such as the existence of private untappable communication channels between each pair of players. These solutions give t-privacy for t n 2 or t n 3 depending on the assumption made. See Figure 1 for a summary of the main results.
Secure computation for honest-but-curious players. Honest-but-curious players must always follow the protocol precisely but are allowed to gossip" afterwards. Namely, some of the players may put together the information in their possession at the end of the execution in order to infer additional information about the original individual inputs. It should be realized that in this honest-but-curious model enforcing the correctness constraint is easy, but enforcing the privacy constraint is hard. The honest-butcurious scenario is not only interesting on its own e.g., for modeling security against outside listeners or against passive adversary that wants to remain undetected; its importance also stems from compilertype" theorems, such as the one proved by GMW-87 1 with further extensions in many subsequent papers, for example, BGW-88, CCD-88, RB-89 . This type of theorems provide algorithms for transforming any t-private protocol with respect to honest-but-curious players into a t 0 -private protocol with respect to malicious players t 0 t. Surprisingly, m uch of the research e orts were devoted to the more complicated case of malicious players, while the case of honest players is far from being well understood. In this paper we examine the latter setting.
Information theoretic privacy. 2 The information theoretic model was rst examined by BGW-88, CCD-88 . In particular, they prove that every function is dn=2e-private in the setting of honest-butcurious players; see Figure 1 . The information theoretic model was then the subject of considerable work e.g., characterized the boolean functions for which n-private protocols exist: an n-argument boolean function f is n-private if and only if it can be represented as fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n = f 1 x 1 f 2 x 2 : : : f n x n where each f i is boolean. Namely, f is n-private if and only if it is the exclusive-or of n local functions. An immediate corollary of this is that most boolean functions are not n-private even with respect to honest-but-curious players.
Our contribution. We formally de ne the notion of reducibility among multi-party protocol problems.
We s a y that f is reducible to g, if there is a protocol that allows the n players to compute the value of f 1 The reader is referred to G-98 for a fully detailed treatment of the Yao-82, GMW-87 results.
2 in oppose to computational-privacy n-privately, in the information theoretic sense, just by repeatedly using a black-box or a trusted party for computing g. That is, in any round of the protocol, the players secretly supply arguments to the black-box and then the black-box publicly announces the result of operating g on these arguments. We stress that the only means of communication among the players is by i n teracting with the black-box i.e., evaluating g. For example, it is clear that every function is reducible to itself all players secretly give their private inputs x 1 ; : : : ; x n to the black-box and it announces the result. Naturally, w e can also de ne the notion of completeness. A function g is complete if every function f is reducible to g. The importance of this notion relies on the following observation:
If g is complete, and g can be computed t-privately in some reasonable" setting 3 such a s the settings of GMW-87, BGW-88 etc., then any function f can be computed t-privately in the same setting. Moreover, from our construction a stronger result follows: if in addition the implementation of g is e cient then so is the implementation of f see below.
The above observation holds since our de nition of reduction requires the highest level of privacy n, the strongest notion of privacy information theoretic, a simple use of g black b o x, and it avoids making any physical or computational assumptions. Hence the straightforward simulation, in which each i n v ocation of the black-box for g is replaced by a n i n v ocation of a t-private" protocol for g, w orks in any reasonable" setting i.e. any setting which is not too weak to prevent simulation and yields a t-private" protocol for f. Previously, there was no easy way to translate protocols from one model such as the models of Yao-82, GMW-87, BGW-88, CCD-88, RB-89, FKN-94 to other models.
It can be seen that if g is complete then g itself cannot be n-private. The inverse is the less obvious part: since the de nition of completeness requires that the same function g will be used for computing all functions f, and since the de nition of reductions seems very restrictive, it may be somewhat surprising that complete functions exist at all. Some examples of complete functions implicitly appear in the literature without discussing the notions of reducibility and completeness. First such results were shown in Yao-82, GMW-87, K-88 .
In this work we prove the existence of complete functions for n-private computations. Moreover, while previous research concentrated on nding a single complete function, our main theorem characterizes all the boolean functions which are complete:
Main Theorem: For all n 2, a n n -argument boolean function g is complete if and only if g is not n-private.
Our result thus show s a v ery strong dichotomy: every boolean function g is either simple enough" so that it can be computed n-privately in the information theoretic model, or it is su ciently expressive" so that a black-box for it enables computing any function not only boolean n-privately i.e., g is complete.
We stress that there is no restriction on g, beside being non-n-private boolean function, and that no relation between the function g and the function f that we wish to compute is assumed. Note that using the characterization of CKu-89 it is easy to determine whether a given boolean function g is complete.
That is, a boolean function g is complete if and only if it cannot be represented as gx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n = g 1 x 1 g 2 x 2 : : : g n x n where each g i is boolean.
Some features of our result. To prove the completeness of a function g as above, we present a n appropriate construction with the following additional properties:
We consider the most interesting scenario, where both the reduced function, f, and the function g are n-argument functions where n is the numb e r o f p l a y ers. This enables us to organize the reduction in rounds, where in each round each player submits a value of a single argument t o g and the value of 3 A setting consists of de ning the type of communication, type of privacy, assumptions made etc. each argument is supplied by exactly one player. 4 Thus, no player is excluded" at any round from the evaluation of g. Our results however remain true even if the number of arguments of g is di erent from the number of arguments of f. Our construction evaluates the n-argument function g only on a constant number of n-tuples hence, a partial implementation of g may be su cient.
When we talk about privacy, w e put no computational restrictions on the power of the players; hence we get information-theoretic privacy. However, when we talk about protocols, we measure their e ciency in terms of the computational complexity o f f i.e., the size of a circuit that computes f; and in terms of a parameter k our protocol allows error probability o f 2 , k . The protocol we introduce is e cient polynomial in all these measures. 5 We stress, though, that the n-tuples with which w e use the function g are chosen non-uniformly namely, they are encoded in the protocol for the particular choices of g and n the size of the network. These n-tuples do not depend though neither on the size of the inputs to the protocol nor on the function f. Our main theorem gives a full characterization of the boolean functions g which are complete those that are not n-private. When non-boolean functions are considered, it turns out that the above simple characterization is no longer true. That is, we show that there are non-boolean functions which are not n-private, yet are not complete.
Overview of the proof. Our proof goes along the following lines:
1. We de ne the notion of embedded-OR for two-argument functions and appropriately generalize this notion to the case of n-argument functions. We then show that if an n-argument function is not private then it contains an embedded-OR. For the case n = 2 this follows immediately from the characterization of CKu-89 ; the case n 2 requires some additional technical work.
2. We show h o w a n e m bedded-OR can be used to implement a n Oblivious Transfer OT channel primitive. 6 It should be emphasized that an OT channel in a multi-party setting has the additional requirement that listeners do not get any information; we prove h o w ever that this property is already implied by the basic properties of two-party OT. Finally, it follows from the work of GHY-87, GV-87, K-88, BG-89, GL-90 that n-private computation of any function f can be implemented given OT channels.
All together, our main theorem follows.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we specify our model and provide some necessary de nitions.
In Section 3 we prove our main lemma that shows the existence of an embedded-OR in every non nprivate, boolean function; In Section 4 we use the main lemma i.e., the existence of an embedded-OR to implement O T c hannels between players; In Section 5 we use the construction of OT channels to prove our main theorem. Finally, Section 6 contains a discussion of the results and some open problems. For completeness, we include in the appendix a known protocol for private computations using OT channels including its formal proof.
4
Which player submits which argument i s a p e r m utation speci ed by the reduction.
5
Evaluating g on any assignment is assumed to take a unit time. All other operations communication, computation steps, etc. are measured in the regular way.
6
Oblivious transfer is a protocol for two players: a sender that holds two bit b0 and b1 and a receiver that holds a selection bit s. A t the end of the protocol the receiver gets the bit bs but has no information about the value of the other bit, while the sender has no information about s.
Model and De nitions
Let f be an n-argument function de ned over a nite domain D. Consider a collection of n 2 synchronous, computationally unbounded players P 1 ;: : : ;P n that communicate using a black-box for g, as described below. At the beginning of an execution, each player P i has an input x i 2 D . In addition, each player can ip unbiased and independent random coins. We denote by r i the string of random bits ipped by P i sometimes we refer to the string r i as the random input of P i . The players wish to compute the value of a function fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n . To this end, they use a prescribed protocol F. In the i-th round of the protocol, every processor P j secretly sends a message m i j to the black-box g. 7 The protocol F speci es which argument to the black-box i s p r o vided by which player. The black-box then publicly announces the result of evaluating the function g on the input messages. Formally, with each round i the protocol associates a permutation i . The value computed by the black-box at round i, denoted s i , i s s i = g m i i 1 ; m i i 2 ; : : : ; m i i n . Each message m i j , sent b y P j to the black-box in the i-th round, is determined by its input x j , its random input r j , and the output of the black-box in previous rounds s 1 ; : : : ; s i , 1 . We s a y that the protocol F computes the function f if the last value or the last sequence of values in the case of non-boolean f announced by the black-box equals the value of fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n with probability 1 , 2 , k , where k is a con dence parameter and the probability i s o v er the choice of r 1 ; : : : ; r n .
Let F be an n-party protocol, as described above. The communication Sx; r is the concatenation of all messages announced by the black-box, while executing F on inputs x 1 ; : : : ; x n and random inputs r 1 ; : : : ; r n . W e often consider the communication S while xingx and some of the r i 's; in this case, the communication should be thought of as a random-variable where each o f t h e r i 's that were not xed is chosen according to the corresponding probability distribution. For example, if T is a set of players then Sx; fr i g i2T is a random variable describing the communication when each player P i holds input x i , each player in T holds random input r i , and the random inputs for all players in T are chosen randomly. The de nition of privacy considers the distribution of such random variables.
De nition 1 Let F be a n n -party protocol which computes a function f, and let T f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n gb e a set of players coalition. We say that coalition T does not learn any additional information from the execution of F if the following holds: For every two input vectorsx andỹ that agree on their T entries i.e. 8i 2 T : x i = y i and for which fx = f y , for every choice o f r andom inputs for the coalition's parties, fr i g i2T , and for every communication S Pr fr i g i2T Sx; fr i g i2T = S = P r f r i g i 2 T S y;fr i g i2T = S :
Informally, this de nition implies that for all inputs which look the same" from the coalition`s point of view and for which, in particular, f has the same value, the communication also look the same" it is identically distributed. Therefore, by executing F, the coalition T cannot infer any information on the inputs of T, other than what follows from the inputs of T and the value of the function.
De nition 2 A p r otocol F for computing f, using a black-box g, i s t-private if any coalition T of at most Oblivious Transfer is a protocol for two players S, the sender, and R, the receiver. I t w as rst de ned by Rabin R-81 and since then was studied in many w orks e.g., W-83, FMR-85, K-88, IL-89, OVY-91 . The variant of OT protocol that we use here, which is often referred to as , 2 1 -OT, was originally de ned in EGL-85 . It was shown equivalent to other notions of OT see, for example R-81, EGL-85, BCR-86, B-86, C-87, K-88, CK-88 . The formalization of OT that we give is in terms of the probability distribution of the communication transcripts between the two players:
De nition 4 Oblivious Transfer OT: Let k be a c on dence parameter. The sender S initially has two bits b 0 and b 1 and the receiver R has a selection bit c. After the protocol completion the following holds: Correctness: Receiver R gets the value of b c with probability greater than 1,2 , k , where the probability is taken over the coin-tosses of S and R. More formally, let r S , r R 2 f 0 ; 1 g polyk be the random tapes of S and R respectively, and denote the communication string by commfb 0 ; b 1 ; c g ; f r S ; r R g 2 f 0 ; 1 g polyk .
Again, when one or both of r S ; r R is unspeci ed then comm becomes a random variable. Then, for all k and for all c; b 0 ; b 1 2 f 0 ; 1 g the following holds:
Pr r S ;r R Rc; r R ; commfb 0 ; b 1 ; c g ; f r S ; r R g = b c 1 , 1
Rc; r R ; comm denotes the output of receiver R when it has a selection bit c, r andom input r R and the communication in the protocol is comm. REMARK: We emphasize that both S and R are honest but curious and assumed to follow the protocol. When OT is de ned with respect to cheating players, it is usually allowed that with probability 2 , k information will leak. This however is not needed for honest players.
A New Characterization of n-private Boolean Functions
In this section we prove our main lemma which establishes a new combinatorial characterization of the family of n-private boolean functions. First, we de ne what it means for a two-argument boolean function to have a n e m bedded-OR" and use CKu-89 to claim that any t w o-argument boolean function which i s not 1-private contains an embedded-OR. We then generalize the de nition and the claim to multi-argument functions in the appropriate way.
De nition 5 We say that a two-argument function h contains an embedded-OR if there exist inputs x 0 ; x 1 ; y 0 ; y 1 x 0 6 = x 1 ,y 0 6 = y 1 and an output value such that hx 1 ; y 1 = h x 1 ; y 0 = h x 0 ; y 1 = but hx 0 ; y 0 6 = .
De nition 6 We say that an n-argument n 3 function f contains an embedded-OR if there exist indices 1 i j n , and values a k for all k = 2 f i; jg, such that the two-argument function hy;z 4 =fa 1 ; : : : ; a i , 1 ; y ; a i +1 ; : : : ; a j , 1 ; z ; a j +1 ; : : : ; a n c ontains an embedded-OR.
The following facts are proven in CKu-89 or follow trivially from it:
1. An n-argument boolean function is dn=2e-private if and only if it can be written as fx 1 ; : : : ; x n = f 1 x 1 : : : f n x n , where each f i is boolean. = fx 1 ; : : : ; x n ; is 1-private. Our main lemma extends Fa c t 2 a b o v e to the case of multi-argument functions.
Lemma 1 Main Lemma: Let gx 1 : : : ; x n b e any boolean, n-argument function. The function g is not dn=2e-private if and only if it contains an embedded-OR. Proof: Clearly, i f g contains an embedded-OR then there is a partition of the indices, as in Fact 4, such that the corresponding two-argument function g S contains an embedded-OR e.g., if i; j are the indices guaranteed by De nition 6 then include the index i in S, the index j in S, and partition the other n , 2 indices arbitrarily into two halves between S and S. Hence, g S is not 1-private and so, by F act 4, g is not dn=2e-private. For the other direction, since g is not dn=2e-private then, again by F act 4, there is a partition S; S of the indices f1; : : : ; n gsuch that g S is not 1-private. For simplicity of notations, we assume that n is even and that S = f1; : : : ; n = 2 g . B y F act 2, the two-argument function g S contains an embedded-OR. Hence, by De nition 5, there exist inputs u; v; w; z and a value 2 f 0 ; 1 g which form the following structure: g S ; w = w n 2 +1 ; : : : ; w n z= z n 2 +1 ; : : : ; z n u = u 1 ; : : : ; u n 2 v= v 1 ; : : : ; v n 2 where u 6 = v and w 6 = z. T o complete the proof, we will show below that it is possible to choose these four inputs so that u i 6 = v i for exactly one coordinate i and w j 6 = z j for exactly one coordinate j this will show that g satis es the condition of De nition 6. To this end, we will rst show h o w based on the inputs above w e can nd u 0 and v 0 which are di erent in exactly one coordinate. Then, based on the new u 0 ; v 0 and a similar argument, we can nd w 0 ; z 0 which are di erent in exactly one coordinate. All this process is done in a way that maintains the OR-like structure, and therefore, by using the above v alues of i; j, xing all the other arguments in S to u 0 k = v 0 k and all the other arguments in S to w 0 k = z 0 k , w e get that g itself contains an embedded-OR. = fx = x 1 ; :::; x n=2 j g S x; w 6 = g S x; zg; where w and z are the speci c vectors we c hoose above. In particular, we h a v e u 2 X 1 and v 2 X 2 .
We n o w claim that there must exist u 0 ; v 0 as required. Namely, the vector u 0 is in X 1 , the vector v 0 is in X 2 and u 0 ; v 0 di er in exactly one coordinate. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that this is not true i.e., no such u 0 ; v 0 exist. We will show that this implies that T m X 1 , for all 0 m j L j , contradicting the fact that v which i s i n T j L j belongs to X 2 . The proof is by induction. It is true for m = 0 a s T 0 contains only u which i s i n X 1 . Suppose the induction hypothesis holds for m. That is, T m X 1 . F or each v ector x in T m+1 , there is a vector in T m which di ers from x in exactly one coordinate. Since we assumed that u 0 ; v 0 as above do not exist, this immediately implies that x is also in X 1 hence T m+1 X 1 , as needed. 
Constructing Embedded Oblivious Transfer
The rst, very simple, observation is that given a black-box for a function g that contains an embedded-OR, we can actually compute the OR of two bits. That is, suppose that the n players wish to compute ORb k ; b where b k is a bit held by player P k and b`is a bit held by player P`. Let i; j; x 0 ; x 1 ; y 0 ; y 1 be the indices and inputs as guaranteed by De nitions 5 and 6. Then, player P k will provide the black b o x with the i-th argument which i s x b k i.e., if b k = 0 then the argument provided by P k is x 0 and if b k = 1 then the argument i s x 1 and player P`will provide the black b o x with the j-th argument which i s x b .
The other n , 2 players will provide the n , 2 xed values a 1 ; : : : ; a i , 1 ; a i +1 ; : : : ; a j , 1 ; a j +1 ; : : : ; a n in an arbitrary order. The black-box will answer with the value ga 1 ; : : : ; a i , 1 ; x b k ; a i +1 ; : : : ; a j , 1 ; x b ; a j +1 ; : : : ; a n which i s if ORb k ; b = 1 and is di erent than if ORb k ; b = 0. Hence, we showed how to compute ORb k ; b .
Our main goal in this section is to show h o w, based on a black-box that can compute OR we can implement an Oblivious Transfer OT protocol. We start with the two-party case n = 2 and then proceed to the general case which builds upon the two-party case.
The Two-Party Case
In this section we show h o w to implement a t w o-party OT protocol. We start by implementing a variant of OT, called random OT or ROT for short, which is di erent than the standard OT i.e., , 2 1 -OT. In a ROT protocol the sender S has a bit s to be sent. At the end of the protocol, the receiver R gets a bit s 0 such that with probability 1 = 2 the bit s 0 equals s and with probability 1 = 2 the bit s 0 is random. The receiver knows which of the two cases happened and the sender has no idea which is the case. We start with a formal de nition of the ROT primitive:
De nition 7 Random Oblivious Transfer ROT: Let k be a c on dence parameter. The sender S initially has a single input bit s and the receiver has no input. After the protocol completion the following holds:
Correctness: With probability greater than 1 , 2 , k , r e c eiver R outputs a pair of bits I;s 0 , where I is referred t o a s t h e indicator otherwise R outputs fail. As usual, the probability is taken over the coin-tosses of S and R, i.e., r S , r R 2 f 0 ; 1 g polyk . Pr r R comms; r S ; r R = comm j I = 0 =Pr r R comms; r S ; r R = comm j I = 1 :
T ransformations of ROT protocols to , 2 1 -OT protocols are well-known C-87 . 8 Our ROT protocol is implemented as follows: 8 Assume that the sender, S, has two bits b0; b 1 and the receiver, R, has a selection bit c. The players S and R repeat the following for at most m = k times: at each time S tries to send to R a pair of random bits s1; s 2 using two i n v ocations of ROT. If in both trials the receiver gets the actual bit or in both trials he gets a random bit then they try for another time.
If the receiver got exactly one of s1 and s2 he sends the sender a permutation of the indices i.e., either 1; 2 or 2; 1 such that s c is known to him. The sender replies with b1 s 1 ; b 2 s 2 . The receiver can now retrieve the bit bc and knows nothing about the other bit. The sender, by observing learns nothing about c since he does not know from the invocation of the ROT protocols in which i n v ocation the receiver got the actual bit and in which he got a random bit. Thus, we get a S chooses a pair a 1 ; a 2 out of the two pairs f1; 0; 0; 1g, each with probability 1 = 2. R chooses a pair b 1 ; b 2 out of the three pairs f1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1g, each with probability 1 = 3. S and R compute using the black-box c To analyze the protocol we observe the following properties of it:
1. If b 1 ; b 2 = a 1 ; a 2 then one of c 1 ; c 2 is 0. This happens in two of the six choices of a 1 ; a 2 and b 1 ; b 2 , i.e., with probability 1 = 3. In each of the other four choices we get c 1 = c 2 = 1. Therefore, the probability of failure in m = k trials is exponentially small. 2. Conditioned on the case c 1 = c 2 = 1 , w e h a v e b 1 ; b 2 = a 2 ; a 1 with probability 1 = 2 t w o out of the four remaining cases and b 1 ; b 2 = 1 ; 1 with probability 1 = 2.
3. In case that b 1 ; b 2 = a 2 ; a 1 , we h a v e in particular b 2 = a 1 and so s 0 = w b 2 = s a 1 b 2 = s . In this case R outputs I = 1, as needed.
In case that b 1 ; b 2 = 1 ; 1, each of the two c hoices of a 1 ; a 2 is equally likely and therefore a 1 and hence also w and s 0 are random i.e., each has the value 0 with probability 1 = 2 and the value 1 with probability 1 = 2. In this case R outputs I = 0, as needed. 4. As argued in 3, if the protocol does not fail then R knows the correct" value of I since he knows the values of b 1 ; b 2 ; c 1 and c 2 . The sender, on the other hand, based on a 1 ; a 2 cannot know which of the two equally-probable events, b 1 ; b 2 = a 2 ; a 1 o r b 1 ; b 2 = 1 ; 1, happened and therefore he sees the same view whether we are in the case I = 1 or in the case I = 0 . Properties 1 and 3 above imply the correctness of the ROT protocol while properties 2 and 4 imply the sender's privacy and receiver's privacy respectively. Hence, combining the above construction including the transformation of the ROT protocol to a , 2 1 -OT protocol with Lemma 1, we get:
Lemma 2 An OT-channel between two players is realizable given a black-box g, for any non-2-private function g.
The Multi-Party Case n 2
W e h a v e shown in our main lemma Lemma 1 that any non n-private function g contains an embedded-OR. Thus, as explained above, we can use the black-box for g to compute the OR of two bits held by two players P k and P`where the other n , 2 players assist by specifying the xed arguments given by our main lemma. Then, based on the ability to compute OR, we showed in Section 4.1 above h o w a n y t w o players can implement a n O T c hannel between them in a way that satis es the properties of OT in particular, the privacy of the sender and the receiver with respect to each other. However, there is a subtle di culty in implementing a private OT-channel in a multi-player system which w e m ust address: beside the usual properties of an OT channel as speci ed by De nition 4, we should guarantee that the information transmitted between the two o wners of the channel will not be revealed to potential listeners i.e., the other n , 2 players. If the OT channel is implemented physically" then clearly no information is revealed to the listeners. However, since we implement OT using a black-box to some function g, which publicly announces each of its outcomes, we m ust also prove that this reveals no information to the listeners.
That is, the communication comm should be distributed in the same way, for all values of b 1 ; b 2 and c.
The following lemma shows that the security of the OT protocol with respect to listeners is, in fact, already guaranteed by the basic properties of the OT protocol; namely, the security of the protocol with respect to both the receiver and the sender. The receiver's privacy property implies that the terms 1 and 2 are equal, 3 and 4 are equal, 5 and 6 are equal, and 7 and 8 are equal. The sender's privacy property implies that the terms 1 and 3 are equal, 5 and 7 are equal, 2 and 6 are equal, and 4 and 8 are equal. All together, we get that all 8 probabilities are equal, as desired.
5 A Completeness Theorem for Multi-Party Boolean Black-Box Reductions
In this section we state the main theorem and provide its proof. It is based on a protocol that can tolerate n , 1 honest-but-curious players, assuming the existence of an OT-channel between each pair of players.
Such protocols appear in GHY-87, GV-87, K-88, BG-89, GL-90 these works deal also with malicious players. That is, by these works we get the following lemma for self-containment, both a protocol and its proof of security appear in the appendix:
Lemma 4 Given OT channels between each pair of players, any n-argument function f can be c omputed n-privately in time polynomial in the size of a boolean circuit for f.
We are now ready to state our main theorem:
Theorem 1 MAIN: Let n 2 and let g be a n n -argument boolean function. The function g is complete if and only if it is not n-private.
Proof:
= First, we show that any complete g cannot be n-private. Towards the contradiction let us assume that there exists such a function g which i s n -private and complete. This implies that all functions are n-private as instead of using the black-box g the players can evaluate g by using the n-private protocol for g. This however contradicts the results of BGW-88, CKu-89 that show the existence of functions which are not n-private. = Next and this is where the bulk of the work is we show h o w to compute any function n-privately, given a black-box for any g which is not n-private. Recall that there exists a protocol that can tolerate n ,1 honest-but-curious players, assuming the existence of OT-channels Lemma 4. Also, we h a v e shown how a black-box, computing any non-private function, can be used to simulate OT channels Lemma 2 and 3. Combining all together we get the result.
2
The theorem implies that most" boolean functions are complete. That is, any boolean function which i s not of the XOR-form of CKu-89 is complete.
Conclusions and Further Extensions 6.1 Non-boolean Functions
We h a v e shown that any non-n-private boolean function g is complete. Namely, a black-box for such a function g can be used for computing any function f n -privately. Finally, let us brie y turn our attention to non-boolean functions. First, we emphasize that if a function g contains an embedded-OR then it is still complete even if it is non-boolean all the arguments go through as they are; in particular note that De nitions 5 and 6 of embedded-OR apply for the non-boolean case as well. For the non-boolean case, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For every n 2 there exists a non-boolean n-argument function g which is not n-private, yet such that g is not complete.
Proof: The proof for 2-argument g is as follows: there are non-private two-argument functions which d o not contain an embedded OR. Examples of such functions were shown in Ku-89 see Figure 2 . We n o w show that with no embedded-OR one cannot compute the OR function. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is some two-argument function f which does not have a n e m bedded-OR, yet it could be used to compute the OR function. Since f can be used to compute the OR function, we can use it to implement OT Lemma 2. Hence, there exists an implementation of OT based on some f which does not have a n embedded-OR. However, K-91 has shown that for two-argument functions, only the ones that contain an embedded-OR, can be used to implement OT, deriving a contradiction.
For n-argument functions, notice that if we de ne a function g on n arguments to depend only on its rst two arguments, we are back to the 2-argument case, as the resulting function is not n-private. 2
To conclude, we h a v e shown that for boolean case, the notions of completeness and privacy are exactly complementary, while for the non-boolean case they are not. 
Additional Remarks
In this section, we brie y discuss some possible extensions and easy generalizations of our results.
The rst issue that we address is the need for the protocol to specify the permutation i that is used in each round i for mapping the players to the arguments for the black-box g. Note that in our construction, we use the black-box only for computing the OR function on two arguments. For this, we need to map some two players P k and P`, holding these two arguments, to the special coordinates i; j, guaranteed by the de nition of embedded-OR. Therefore, without loss of generality, the sequence of permutations can be made oblivious i.e., independent of the function f computed at a price of On 2 m ultiplicative factor to the rounds and time. Moreover, at a price of On 4 the sequence of permutations can even be made independent of the non-n-private function g. Finally, note that if g is a symmetric function which is often the interesting" case, then there is no need to permute the inputs to g.
Next, we recall the assumption that the number of arguments of g is the same as the number of arguments of f i.e., n. Again, it follows from our constructions that this is not essential to any of our results: all that is needed is the ability for the two players P k ; P , that wish to compute the OR function in a certain step, to do so by providing the two distinguished arguments i; j for g and all the other xed arguments can be provided by arbitrary players e.g., all of them by P 1 .
In our de nitions we require perfect privacy. That is, we require that the two distributions in De nition 1 are identical. One can relax this de nition of privacy to require only statistical indistinguishability of distributions or only computational indistinguishability of distributions. For these de nitions we refer the reader to the papers mentioned in the introduction. Note that if f can be computed privately", under any of these notions, using a black-box for g and if g can be computed t-privately, under any of these notions, then also the function f can be computed t-privately, under the appropriate notion of privacy i.e., the weaker among the two.
Finally, w e note that the negative result of CKu-89 allows a probability of error; hence, even a weaker notion of reduction that allows for errors in computing f does not change the family of complete functions.
This impossibility result i.e., rst direction of the main theorem still holds even if we allow the players to communicate not only using the black-box but also using other types of communication such as pointto-point communication channels.
Open Questions
The above results can be easily extended to show that any boolean g which is complete can also be used for a private computation of any multi-output function f i.e., a function whose output is an n-tuple y 1 ; : : : ; y n , where y i is the output that should be given to P i . This is so, because Lemma 4 still holds. On the other hand, it is an interesting question to characterize the multi-output functions g that are complete even in the boolean case where each output of g is in f0; 1g.
It is not clear how to extend the model and the results to the case of malicious players in its full generality. Notice, however, that under the appropriate de nition of the model, if we are given as a black-box the two-argument OR function we can still implement private channels see KMO-94 for details, and hence by BGW-88, CCD-88 can implement a n y f , n=3-privately with respect to malicious players.
Suppose that we relax the notion of privacy to computational-privacy as in In such a case, any computationally n-private implementation of an information-theoretically non-nprivate equivalently, complete boolean function g implies the existence of a one-way function. This is so, since we h a v e shown that such an implementation of g implies an implementation of OT, which i n turn implies the existence of a one-way function by IL-89 . However, the best known implementation of such protocols, for a function g as above, requires trapdoor one-way permutations GMW-87 . It is an important question whether there exists an implementation based on a one-way function or permutation for functions without trap-door. This question has only some partial answers. In particular, when one of the players has super-polynomial power, this is possible OVY-91 . However, if we focus on polynomialtime players and protocols, then the result of our paper together with the work of IR-89 implies that for all complete functions, if we use only black-box reductions, this is as di cult as separating P from N P .
Thus, using black-box reductions, complete functions seem to be hard to implement with computational privacy without a trapdoor property. Notice, however, that for non-boolean functions we h a v e shown that there are functions which are not n-private and not complete. It is not known even if these functions can be implemented without using trapdoor, although the results of IR-89 do not apply to this case. H o w ever, if player P i will know a i b j for j 6 = i he might be able to compute b j , violating the privacy requirement. Instead, we let P i and P j interact in a two-party protocol, so that at the end P i will know v i;j 4 = a i b j , r i;j , and P j will know r i;j , where r i;j is a random bit note that v i;j + r i;j equals a i b j . This is done by letting P j choose r i;j at random. Then, P i receives from P j , via their common OT-channel, the a i -th element of the pair of values 0b j ,r i;j ; 1b j ,r i;j this pair can be easily computed by P j . Clearly, this element, is exactly a i b j ,r i;j , as desired.
As they use the OT-channel, P j has no idea which v alue P i selected. We repeat this two-party protocol for each pair P i ; P j . Each player computes c i = a i b i + P j6 =i v i;j + P j6 =i r j;i . It can be veri ed that c = P n i=1 c i .
3 Revealing fx 1 ; : : : ; x n :Each player P i broadcasts its share of the output gate of the circuit. The sum of these shares is the desired value. In the lemmas below, we v erify inductively that during the computation each v ector of shares has the required sum, and that the distribution in any proper subset of the shares is uniform. In addition, the interaction gives no information about previously computed shares. These properties give the correctness and privacy of the protocol.
2
Let ViewT ;fx i g;fR i g i 2 T denote the view that the set of players coalition T has on the communication, given that each player P i 1 i n has input x i and that each player P i in T has random string R i . This is a random variable which is determined by the choice of random strings R i for all players P i not in T. W e include in this view only messages that goes from players in T to players in T. Note that these messages together with the inputs and random strings of players in T completely de ne the messages sent among players in T and also messages sent from players in T to players in T.
In the above protocol there is no communication for addition gates. Hence the view consists only of messages received during the sharing stage, during the evaluation of multiplication gates, and during the revealing stage. The rst claim says that in a single evaluation of a multiplication gate no information is revealed.
Claim 5 Consider the subprotocol evaluating a gate c = ab. For all coalitions T, for all set of shares a 1 ; : : : ; a n b 1 ; : : : ; b n which are the input for this subprotocol i.e., fa i ; b i gis the input for player P i , for all choices of random strings for players in T, fR i g i2T , and for all communication comm 2 f 0 ; 1 g s , where s = jTjn , j T j , we have: Pr ViewT ;fa i ; b i g ; f R i g i 2 T = comm = 2 , s ; where the probability goes over all choices of R i for i 2 T.
Proof: The communication that goes from T to T is as follows: for every i 2 T and j 2 T the players P i ; P j jointly compute" a i b j and a j b i . In computing a j b i the player P i does not get any message his role is to pick a random r j;i and to send a messages over their common OT-channel. In computing a i b j the player P i receives a one bit message v i;j . Hence, the view of coalition T must be of size s. Moreover, as r i;j is chosen by P j uniformly at random, then v i;j is also uniformly distributed in f0; 1g independently of what a i and b j are. As all r i;j 's are independent, the claim follows. 2
The next claim shows that at each stage of the computation the vector of shares is uniformly distributed. This is particularly important in the revealing stage, when we need to be sure that only the output is revealed.
Claim 6 Let x 1 ; : : : ; x n b e an input to the protocol i.e., x i is the input for player P i . Let C be a gate in the circuit and let c be the value of this gate when the input for the circuit is x 1 ; : : : ; x n . L etC be a v e ctor of shares that represents c in the above protocol. Then, P n i=1 C i = c correctness; and C is uniformly distributed among the vectors whose sum is c privacy. I.e., let c 1 ; : : : ; c n satisfy P c i = c there a r e 2 n , 1 such vectors then Pr C = c 1 ; : : : ; c n j x = 1 = 2 n , 1 .
Proof: The rst part easily follows from the description of the protocol, by induction. The second part is also proved by induction. The claim is certainly true after the sharing stage as this is the way the shares are chosen. Now suppose we e v aluate a gate. If the gate is an addition gate, computing C = A + B, then Pr C = c 1 ; : : : ; c n j x = X a 1 ;:::;an; P a i =A Pr Ã = a 1 ; : : : ; a n j x Pr B = c 1 , a 1 ; : : : ; c n , a n j x = 2 n , 1 1 2 n , 1 1 2 n , 1 = 1 2 n , 1 :
If the gate computes C = A B then we can xÃ = a 1 ; : : : ; a n andB = b 1 ; : : : ; b n and now show that for any such xed choice stillC satis es the requirement. In particular, it su ces to show b y induction on i that the probability that C 1 = c 1 ; : : : ; C i = c i , for i n , 1 i s 1 = 2 i . T o do so, we consider the bits r i;j j 6 = i and r j;i j 6 = i and assign random values to each of them that were not assigned values so far. As at least one of those random bits e.g., r n;i is still free" this implies that c i will be uniformly distributed as r n;i is one of the summands that construct c i . Clearly, when we consider C n all the random bits already got values and hence the value of C n is already determined. 2
We n o w turn to the proof of privacy of the whole protocol:
Claim 7 For all coalitions T of size 1 j T j n , 1 , for all input x 1 ; : : : ; x n , for all choices of random strings for players in T, fR i g i2T , and for all possible communication comm 11 Pr ViewT ;fx i g;fR i g i 2 T = comm = 2 , d ; for d = jTj n T + m j T j n , j T j + n , j T j , 1, where m is the number of multiplication gates in the circuit for f, and n T is the number of inputs for the circuit held by players in T. A gain, the probability goes over all choices of R i for i 2 T.
Proof: In the sharing stage, each player in T receives a share a bit from each input to the circuit held by player in T by de nition there are n T such bits. The properties of the secret-sharing guarantee that each of these bits is 0 with probability 1 = 2 and they are all independent. The evaluation of addition gates does not involve a n y communication. Claim 5 guarantees that in the evaluation of any m ultiplication gate, no matter what are the shares that the players start with, the view of the players in T consists of a random string of length jTjn , j T j . Also, note that each of these evaluations make use of new independent 11 a communication is possible for x1; : : : ; x n if it is consistent with fx1; : : : ; x n . random bits. Finally if f 1 ; : : : ; f n are the shares representing the outcome of the circuit, then by Claim 6 this vector is uniformly distributed among the vectors whose sum equals fx 1 ; : : : ; x n . Therefore, the players in T get in the revealing stage n , j T j bits which form 2 n,jTj,1 combinations each with equal probability. Note that if jTj = n , 1 then in the revealing stage the players in T get only one bit which i s uniquely determined byx. H o w ever, if jTj n , 1 then the independence of the communication seen in the revealing stage and the communication seen in previous stages is guaranteed by the random bits r i;j for i; j 2
T. Combining all together we get the desired claim. 2
Corollary 8 For all coalitions T of size 1 j T j n , 1 , for all inputs x 1 ; : : : ; x n and y 1 ; : : : ; y n such that fx 1 ; : : : ; x n = f y 1 ; : : : ; y n and such that x i = y i for all i 2 T, for all choices of random strings for players in T, fR i g i2T , and for all communication comm Pr ViewT ;fx i g;fR i g i 2 T = comm = Pr ViewT ;fy i g;fR i g i 2 T = comm ; where the probability goes over all choices of R i for i 2 T.
